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On 3 January 2012, Abdelilah Benkirane, Secretary 
General of the Justice and Development Party 
(PJD), unveiled his government. On 13 December, 
Abdessalam Yassine, founder of the Justice and 
Charity movement, considered the most serious 
opponent of the Moroccan monarchy, passed away. 
Neither of these events led to catastrophe.
The formation of a coalition government, albeit one 
presided by the Islamist Benkirane, is an unprece-
dented experience that marks the culmination of 
the institutional normalisation of a sector of Moroc-
can Islamism that began twenty years ago. It more-
over offers the opportunity to determine the true 
ideological orientation of the PJD and its manage-
ment capacity in office. At the same time, this expe-
rience puts to the test the division of powers be-
tween the Head of Government and the Monarchy 
one year after the popular demonstrations that led 
to the reform of the Moroccan Constitution, in 
which the young members of the Justice and Char-
ity movement played an important role.
the benkirane Government
The distribution of the portfolios in the governing 
coalition reflects the electoral results: the PJD is 
predominant, with 11 ministers, followed by the Is-
tiqlal or Independence Party with 6, and the Popu-
lar Movement and the Progress and Socialism 
Party, which each have 4. However, there are sev-
eral ministers without partisan profiles whose ap-
pointment was the result of their connections with 
the King. This might seem logical in areas of gov-
ernment such as Religious Affairs or Defence, but 
it runs contrary to the Constitution adopted in 
2011 in the case of the Secretariat General of the 
Government or the Ministry of Agriculture. In reali-
ty, what the make-up of the government reflects is 
how the King maintained his veto rights when 
choosing the ministers proposed by Benkirane. 
Moreover, more than ever before, the Royal Cabi-
net, has become a genuine “shadow cabinet,” in-
corporating the men responsible for the most im-
portant portfolios in recent years, such as Taieb 
Fassi-Fihri, Foreign Minister in the outgoing gov-
ernment, or Omar Azziman, head of the Advisory 
Committee on Regionalisation, not to mention 
Fouad Ali Al-Himma, a former classmate and trust-
ed confidant of Mohamed VI’s, tasked with han-
dling his relations with the political forces.
Nevertheless, nearly all the PJD’s heavyweights have 
been rewarded. In addition to the Foreign Ministry, 
they hold several other key posts, such as Minister of 
Justice and Liberties, Delegate Minister for the 
Budget at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and 
Minister of Equipment and Transport. This makes 
them responsible for handling a number of key is-
sues inherited from the previous government, name-
ly: the justice reform, the budget deficit, the promise 
to find public-sector work for unemployed university 
graduates, and the construction of a high-speed 
train. Separately, attention should be called, due to 
its significance, to the inclusion of just one woman in 
the government (at the helm of the Ministry of Soli-
darity, Women, Family and Social Development), a 
clear backslide in the feminisation of public life and 
the holding of political office.
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Government action
The actions of the Benkirane Government have 
primarily been conditioned by the need to prepare 
the organic laws specifying the implementation of 
the 2011 Constitution. This has been its main 
challenge. However, of the 16 organic laws and 
20 ordinary laws promised, only the text regarding 
the appointments of senior officials in the public 
administration and state companies has been en-
acted.
The make-up of the government 
reflects how the King maintained his 
veto rights when choosing the 
ministers proposed by Benkirane
The legislative inactivity in this regard should not be 
interpreted as general legislative lethargy, but rath-
er as the result, depending on the case, of a lack of 
will or a political inability to tackle core issues re-
lated to the development of the new Constitution. 
In fact, over this period, the government has pro-
duced some sixty laws, often related to internation-
al conventions and treaties, and has undertaken a 
series of initiatives to denounce what might be de-
scribed as “rent situations.” Indeed, the Islamists 
have trained their sights on two areas: civil servants 
and people with licences to carry out activities in 
certain state-controlled economic sectors. Thus, 
lists have been published of people with licences to 
transport passengers or operate aggregate quar-
ries, people who are given public accommodations 
by some ministries, and even the names of the as-
sociations receiving public aid from abroad. Like-
wise, the National Education Ministry’s teaching 
staff and the Health Ministry’s medical staff have 
been barred from working at private establish-
ments, and it has been agreed that positions in the 
civil service will only be awarded by competitive 
exam. Moreover, it has been established that, as 
provided for by law, wage withholdings will apply to 
civil servants on strike, which has raised union 
hackles.
Faced with this less than stellar list of legislative 
accomplishments, the government defends its per-
formance arguing that it has also increased the 
minimum retirement pensions, expanded the health 
insurance system, lowered the prices of certain 
drugs, implemented a family solidarity fund and a 
social cohesion fund, and announced new taxes on 
large fortunes.
To be fair, the Benkirane government has had to 
deal with public finances deteriorated by the meas-
ures taken to neutralise the first outbreaks of the 
Moroccan Spring, the crisis in Europe and a lack-
lustre year for crops. With the increase in oil prices 
and the announcement of a new fund for the poor-
est households, some have seen signs of a forth-
coming reform of the subsidies to basic staples 
that so many have called for, but that no one has 
dared to undertake for fear of the social instability it 
might cause. The solution to this critical financial 
situation lay, once again, in royal diplomacy and re-
quests for aid from Western allies (France and the 
United States) and the Persian Gulf monarchies 
(United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), as well 
as different loans from international financial organ-
isations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Afri-
can Development Bank, the European Investment 
Bank and the Arab Monetary Fund.
While improving the public finances, putting the 
public sector to work and denouncing certain priv-
ileged situations are all positive actions taken by 
the Benkirane government, this same government 
and, in particular, some of the ministers from Ben-
kirane’s own party, have become embroiled in 
multiple controversies involving accusations of Is-
lamic fundamentalism, of a lack of respect for the 
pluralism of Moroccan society, and of insensitivity 
to social problems related to women’s rights and 
civil liberties.
To this end, attention should be called to the draft 
reform of the Moroccan audiovisual sector submit-
ted by the Minister of Communication, Mustapha El 
Khalfi, which proposed broadcasting all calls to 
prayer, Arabising the programming, and pushing 
back news broadcasts in French and Spanish until 
late at night. Given the mobilisation of the propo-
nents of French-language programming, the King 
convened the Minister and the Head of Govern-
ment for a consultation and tasked a committee he 
had appointed himself with the reform.
Likewise controversial were the tone-deaf reac-
tions of both the Minister of Justice and Liberties 
and the Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family & 
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Social Development to the social outpourings re-
sulting from the suicide of a teenager wed against 
her will to her alleged rapist. Under Article 475 of 
the Moroccan Criminal Code, the marriage be-
tween an alleged rapist and his victim makes it 
possible to safeguard the honour of the victim’s 
family while at the same time absolving the rapist 
of any legal action. The social mobilisation to abol-
ish this article coincided with the visit of Minister of 
Justice Mustafa Ramid to the Salafi Sheikh Mo-
hammed Maghraoui, back from a “forced” exile in 
Saudi Arabia for having recently authorised the 
marriage of a nine-year-old girl to an adult.
With regard to the balance of power between the 
government and the Palace, it is worth noting sev-
eral initiatives taken by the King that clearly show 
he has no intention of ceasing to intervene when-
ever he sees fit or of relinquishing certain preroga-
tives. In some cases, his interventions are reactive, 
correcting or modifying the government’s action, as 
in the reform of the television network program-
ming. In others, it is proactive and does not seem to 
take the opinion of the Head of Government or the 
relevant Minister into account, such as with the ap-
pointment of the President of the Court of Auditors 
or the members of the Justice Reform Committee.
The message hidden behind these initiatives and 
snubs is not easy to decipher; however, at the very 
least they highlight the imbalance of power be-
tween the Palace and the Head of Government. 
Benkirane does not dare to criticise the King; how-
ever, he does criticise his advisors, even when he is 
later forced to retract his words and reiterate his 
“loyalty” to the sovereign. The Head of Government 
makes up for this impotence with an active com-
munication policy that contrasts with the silence of 
his predecessors. Populist rhetoric allows him to 
convey his displeasure, the constraints he faces, 
and the failure to re-balance power with the Palace 
in an effort to address his voters’ frustrated expec-
tations for change. However, in the field of pop-
ulism, the competition is fierce.
In the religious terrain, he faces competition from 
Salafi currents and the Justice and Charity move-
ment. With the death of Sheikh Yassine, the 
staunchest advocate of a path of dissidence with 
the regime and an alternative to the PJD’s strategy 
of integration has disappeared. The movement may 
be weakened by the loss of its elderly and charis-
matic leader if the alleged tensions at its core be-
tween proponents of a Sufi approach and advo-
cates of entering the political game prove to be 
real. Meanwhile, the PJD caters to Salafist leaders 
so as to ensure their support, despite growing ru-
mours of the creation of a separate party to repre-
sent this current.
With regard to the balance of 
power between the government 
and the Palace, it is worth noting 
several initiatives taken by the King 
that clearly show he has no 
intention of ceasing to intervene 
whenever he sees fit
In the sphere of official political microcosms, the 
election, not free of controversy, of Hamid Chabat 
to head Istiqlal and of Driss Lachgar to head the 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) promis-
es a media frenzy that will contribute to the image 
of a plural and active political life in Moroccan so-
ciety. In them, Benkirane will face a dual opposi-
tion: within his own government, Chabat, who has 
his eye on the premiership, has called for changes 
in the composition of the government, while Lach-
gar claims to be the leading opponent of the Islam-
ists and has called for the reunification of the forc-
es on the left.
a recurring response on the Social  
and Political Front
Throughout the year, several cities have seen seem-
ingly small and innocuous gatherings (the eviction 
of a family in Tangiers) or protests against the high 
cost of living (in Taza) end in violent confrontations 
with the security forces and harsh prison sentenc-
es. This repression has also affected the 20 Febru-
ary Movement, which, despite having lost much of 
its capacity to draw people out onto the streets, 
continues to denounce symbols of despotism, ine-
quality and the lack of certain freedoms (ceremony 
of fealty to the King, the budget approved for the 
Palace) through social media and at one-off events.
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Meanwhile, the Minister of Justice and Freedom, 
who was one of the most fervent defenders of the 
Salafists detained in relation to the 16 May 2003 
terrorist attacks, today denies the existence of po-
litical prisoners and does not bat an eye when con-
fronted with abuses against the press. Within this 
context, the publication of several reports denounc-
ing human rights violations, the use of torture, and 
the climate of fear in the Western Sahara has fur-
ther chipped away at the government’s credibility. 
Likewise, the delay in implementing the regionalisa-
tion plan and the failed attempt to separate Chris-
topher Ross as the UN Secretary General’s special 
envoy have undermined the credibility of the solu-
tion of an autonomous Sahara under Moroccan 
sovereignty.
Conclusions
For those who expected a true break with the 
past, the results of the first year of the Benkirane 
government can only be described as poor. The 
reasons for this are divided between those who 
blame the Palace’s efforts to undermine it, those 
who attribute it to the party’s lack of governing ex-
perience, those who see governmental incompe-
tence, and those who insist it is due to the funda-
mentalist foundations of the party’s agenda. The 
controversies that have arisen over the year have 
spotlighted the difficulties the government has en-
countered and revealed the impatience of its so-
cial base. These controversies, along with the ev-
er-challenging issue of renewing the leadership of 
the political parties, have helped to project the im-
age of an active democratic life, when, in reality, 
the truly important portfolios remain under the Pal-
ace’s control and show no signs of changing. In 
short, it seems that the Palace has learned to tol-
erate the religious populism of the PJD so long as 
the PJD is functional and acts as a retaining wall 
against the popular discontent that Morocco’s 
current social and economic climate continues to 
cause.
The Palace has learned to tolerate 
the religious populism of the PJD 
so long as the PJD is functional 
and acts as a retaining wall against 
the popular discontent that 
Morocco’s current social and 
economic climate continues to 
cause
